Ben Gurion Airport Shutdown: Can Airlines Recover Losses After the August 2026 Disruption?
Written by Eyal Doron, Partner with S. Horowitz, Tel Aviv, Israel
The sudden disruption at Ben Gurion Airport raises hard questions for airlines about liability, recovery, and what comes next
On August 20, 2026 — one of the busiest days of the summer season, with over 105,000 passengers expected and some 600 flights scheduled — operations at Ben Gurion Airport came to an abrupt halt. Without prior warning or a formal labor dispute declaration, check-in counters were shuttered, baggage handling systems ceased to function, ground services stopped, and the airfield was effectively closed to landings for approximately one hour. Multiple foreign carriers cancelled their flights to Israel entirely. Thousands of passengers were stranded — some in departure halls, others mid-air with nowhere to land. The Israel Airports Authority (IAA) attributed the crisis to a wildcat action initiated by the workers’ labor union, while the Chairman of the IAA Workers’ Union denied any organized strike, blaming a chronic staffing shortage and the physical collapse of overworked employees. The Ministry of Finance estimated the economic damage at NIS 25–30 million.
The immediate question for airlines: statutory compensation to passengers.
Under Section 6(e)(1) of Israel’s Aviation Services Law (2012), carriers are exempt from statutory compensation where a cancellation results from “special circumstances” beyond their control that could not have been avoided even with all reasonable measures. Notably, Section 6(e)(2) also provides an exemption where a flight is cancelled due to a “protected strike or lockout” — but the August 20 action was neither declared nor authorized, making it a sudden wildcat (unprotected) strike that does not fall within this specific safe harbor. The disruption of August 20 squarely fits this framework. It was sudden, unforeseeable in its timing, and caught every stakeholder off guard — the Ministry of Transport, the IAA, and the airlines alike. No carrier could reasonably have anticipated or prevented the operational shutdown of the country’s sole international gateway.
The harder question: can airlines recover their losses — and from whom?
The Israel Airports Authority. Airlines pay substantial fees for airport services and are entitled to rely on the IAA maintaining functional operations. Where the IAA’s own employees and union representatives had repeatedly warned of critical staffing shortages ahead of the peak summer period, a failure to ensure adequate manpower for a predictably high-demand day may constitute actionable negligence under Israeli tort law. In Ashdod Vehicle Industries v. Cizik (CA 593/81, 1987), the Israeli Supreme Court held that strikers may owe a tort duty of care to third parties harmed during a strike, especially when controlling critical public infrastructure. The right to strike is a liberty, not an absolute right, and must be balanced against others’ rights. This may support a negligence claim against both the IAA for inadequate preparation and, in principle, those who initiated the disruption.
The Workers’ Union and the Chairman of the IAA Workers’ Union. The IAA’s internal operations notice explicitly attributed the disruption to a directive from the workers’ union. If so, the union effectively caused airlines to breach their contractual obligations to passengers — a potential tort of inducing breach of contract (tortious interference). However, Israeli law presents significant hurdles: a workers’ union committee lacks independent legal personality and generally cannot be sued in its own name; individual union officers enjoy public-employee immunity unless malice is proven; and Section 62(b) of the Torts Ordinance provides that “a strike and a lockout shall not be deemed a breach of contract” — a provision that courts have tended to interpret broadly as applying not only to protected strikes but to strike action generally, shielding it from claims of inducing breach of contract even by affected third parties such as airlines. That said, the Cizik precedent demonstrates that Section 62(b) does not bar claims framed in negligence rather than inducing breach of contract — a potentially significant alternative avenue.
These are not merely academic questions. The disruption caused real, quantifiable harm — cancelled flights, diverted aircraft, passenger care costs, reputational damage, and cascading scheduling chaos. The legal landscape is complex, and the path to recovery is neither straightforward nor guaranteed. But complexity is not the same as impossibility.
Airlines affected by the August 20 events should carefully assess their exposure, preserve all relevant documentation, and consider whether the available legal avenues merit pursuit. The fact that liability may be difficult to establish does not mean it should go unexamined.
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*This content is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Airlines should consult qualified Israeli counsel to evaluate their specific circumstances and options.